Abstract. Recent trends in the global economy force competitive enterprises to collaborate with each other to analyze markets in a better way and make decisions based on that. Therefore, they might want to share their data with each other to run data mining algorithms over the union of their data to get more accurate and representative results. During this process they do not want to reveal their data to each other due to the legal issues and competition. However, current systems do not consider privacy preservation in data sharing across private data sources. To satisfy this requirement, we propose a distributed middleware, ABA-CUS, to perform intersection, join, and aggregation queries over multiple private data warehouses in a privacy preserving manner. Our analytical evaluations show that ABACUS is efficient and scalable.
Introduction
Recent trends in the global economy force competitive enterprises to collaborate with each other for the purpose of market analysis. One of the most important examples of such collaboration is data sharing to mine and understand the market trends to be used in decision making. However, although enterprises are willing to share information with each other, they do not want to reveal their data. Due to the legal issues and competition in the market, datasources want to preserve the privacy of their data while sharing them. For example, consider a scenario consisting of two hotels, H 1 and H 2 , and two airlines, A 1 and A 2 . Assume hotel H 1 wants to offer a new deal to each of its customers including hotel and flight expenses based on his/her flight history. Therefore, hotel H 1 needs to learn flight history of its customers from airlines A 1 and A 2 . One method to learn flight history of customers is that airlines send all of their data to hotel H 1 so that hotel H 1 can extract desired information. However, these airlines also work with hotel H 2 , which is a competitor of hotel H 1 , and thus they may not want to send all of their data to hotel H 1 . That is because hotel H 1 can discover the customers of hotel H 2 and try to attract them. Therefore, if airlines want to work with both hotels, they cannot send their data to any of these hotels. Similarly, hotel H 1 cannot send its data to airlines so that airlines can extract the information that hotel H 1 needs since airlines will discover each other's customers. In order to be able to collaborate, hotel H 1 should take its customers' information from airlines in a way that airlines A 1 and A 2 share their data with hotel H 1 by only revealing common customers (i.e., revealing H 1 ∩ A 1 to H 1 and A 1 and H 1 ∩ A 2 to H 1 and A 2 ). By using such a method hotel H 1 cannot discover new customers which may be customers of hotel H 2 and also airlines cannot discover new customers which may be customers of the other airline. In addition to this, hotel H 1 may want to know the total amount of its customers' travel expenses or total expenditure of a customer for its future business decisions and offers. Other enterprises may be willing to collaborate with hotel H 1 , if they can preserve their privacy. The essential operations to perform these collaborations are privacy preserving intersection, join and aggregation queries. Unfortunately, we cannot use traditional query processing techniques since they do not consider privacy issues. Therefore, there is a need for privacy preserving query processing and data sharing across multiple private data warehouses.
Data integration and sharing has emerged as an important practical problem from a data management point of view [3, 4, 7, 8, 9] . Techniques used for this purpose commonly assume that the data sources are willing to allow access to all their data without privacy concerns during query processing. This assumption, however, is unrealistic in real life since most of the time data sources are competing enterprises. There have been several techniques in the areas of database and cryptography for privacy preserving data sharing. One of them is to use trusted third parties such that data sources hand over their data and a third party performs the computation on their behalf [1, 10] . The level of trust may not be acceptable in these methods. Another approach is using secure multi-party computation where given m parties and their respective inputs x1, x2, .., xm, a function f (x1, x2, ..., xm) is computed such that all parties can only learn f (x1, x2, ..., xm) but nothing else [6, 7, 11] . The computation and the communication costs make this method impractical for database operations working over a large number of elements.
In this paper, we address the problem of privacy preserving data sharing over multiple private data warehouses. We propose a distributed middleware, ABACUS, to perform intersection, join, and aggregation queries over multiple private data warehouses in a privacy preserving manner. Privacy preservation means that parties involved in the query would only be able to learn the query result but nothing else. In addition, we introduce new types of aggregation queries needed in this context and propose efficient techniques to process them. ABACUS operates as a proxy among private data warehouses and allows users to pose queries over multiple private data warehouses. Our analytical evaluations demonstrate that ABACUS provides an efficient and scalable scheme to perform intersection, join, and aggregation queries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates the problem and presents the architecture overview. Section 3 describes intersection and join query processing. Aggregation query processing is discussed in Section 4 and the analysis is presented in Section 5. The last section concludes the paper.
Problem Definition and Architecture Overview
Enterprises gather data from their multiple operational databases into a data warehouse, which is one the most popular ways of storing data to support decision-making in or- Figure 1 shows an instance of a star schema with the fact table, Sales, and the dimension tables, Customers, Times, and Locations. Current commercial data warehouses support efficient methods to examine data. However, they do not support privacy preserving data sharing across multiple private data warehouses, which is useful for analyzing the market instead of a single company's data. The problem of query processing across multiple private data warehouses is defined as follows:
.., D m be the data warehouses (defined with a star schema) of a set of m data sources P = {P 1 , ..., P m } and q be a query spanning D 1 through D m . The problem is to compute the answer of q without revealing any additional information to any of the data sources.
Agrawal et al. [2] solved the problem of privacy preserving query processing across private databases by restricting it to two data sources with some relaxation in an honestbut-curious environment [6] for intersection and equijoin operations. The honest-butcurious environment means that parties follow the protocols correctly but keep all messages sent and received during the course of the query processing. The relaxation reveals the sizes of the tables or lists in the database to the other party. However, the proposed technique has two shortcomings: 1) Encryption is a computation intensive operation which is not suitable for database operations where large numbers of items need to be processed. 2) It does not support aggregation queries, which are among the most important queries. In this paper, we propose ABACUS for privacy preserving data sharing across multiple private data warehouses. ABACUS eliminates the need for third parties by taking advantage of the star schema and executes intersection, join and aggregation queries in a privacy preserving manner. In addition, we introduce new types of aggregation operators which are useful in the context of data warehouse and solve them efficiently. ABACUS also operates in an honest-but-curios environment and it reveals the size of tables and lists similar to [2] .
ABACUS is a distributed middleware operating on top of any commercial database as shown in Figure 2 . It provides a user interface where users can pose queries over multiple private data warehouses. ABACUS executes queries by running ABACUS nodes operating on different data warehouses. Each ABACUS node interacts with its data warehouse via SQL interface supplied by the underlying commercial database. Then, it contacts other ABACUS nodes and shares its data with them to process queries in a privacy preserving manner using the protocols proposed in this paper.
ABACUS does not aim to solve the problem of revealing additional information to a datasource which poses multiple queries and combines their results in order to obtain additional information about the data. In addition, it does not solve the problem of data discovery and schema mediation. Solutions to these problems are discussed briefly in [2] and they could be used in ABACUS.
Intersection and Join Query Processing
Intersection and join queries are the two important types of queries supported by current commercial databases without privacy concerns. However, in the context of data sharing across multiple private data warehouses we need privacy preserving intersection and join queries. Therefore, we will define the problems of privacy preserving intersection, and join queries and also show how to solve them efficiently in Section 3.1 and Section 3.2 respectively.
Aggregated Intersection
Intersection queries constitute the first step for collaboration over common data items. For example, a company may need to know other companies' opinions about its customers. For this kind of collaboration, two companies need to find the common customers as a first step, i.e., intersection. The intersection of two customer lists can be found easily unless they do not hesitate to reveal their customers to each other. However, most of the time companies may not want to reveal their customer lists but only common customers to each other due to legal issues or competition. To support such a type of collaboration, a method for privacy preserving intersection where parties can only learn items in the intersection but nothing else is needed. Therefore, we first define the problem of finding the intersection of lists in the context of data warehouse while preserving the privacy called aggregated intersection query processing as follows:
.., L m be the lists containing secret data stored by a set of datasources P = {P 1 , P 2 , ..., P m } respectively. For each data source P i , the problem is to find all other data sources, P j , with e ∈ L j for each item e ∈ L i in a privacy preserving manner, i.e., if P j does not have e in L j , then P j will not know e ∈ L i . Example 1. We illustrate the aggregated intersection problem with an example. Consider three datasources P1, P2 and P3 involved in executing aggregated intersection query with customer tables T1, T2 and T3 respectively as shown in Figure 3 . At the end of aggregated query processing, datasources will only learn the common customers they share with other data sources but nothing else. In this example, all data sources will know 6565 exists in tables T1, T2, and T3. P1 and P2 will also know that 8080 is common in their tables. Similarly, P1 and P3 will know that 7070 is common in tables T1 and T3. However, P2 should not be able to know that P1 and P3 have 7070 in their tables. Similarly, P3 must not know that P1 and P2 have 8080 in their tables.
Our solution to the above problem is based on using one-way secure cryptographic hash functions. These hash functions are widely used in many real life applications such as password protection, message authentication, and digital signatures. The examples of such hash functions include SHA-1, MD4, and MD5 [12] . A simple solution to the aggregated intersection problem could use one-way hash functions and compare hashed values of items to determine whether they are the same or not. Basically, data source P i computes the hashed list of list L i by computing the hash value of each item in L i . Then, it sends the hashed list to data source P j so that it can compare the incoming hashed list with its own hashed list to find the common items in L i and L j . According to this scheme, in Example 1, data source P 1 In the context of data warehouses, data sources usually have more information about the secret items. For example, all data sources in Example 1 keep name, last name, phone and address information as well as SSN (Social Security Number) of a customer in their customers tables. If all of these information is used in hashing, then the domain will become large. For instance, instead of hashing SSN, a concatenation of SSN, name, last name, phone and address could be used in hashing, i.e., H(6565|Jack|Brial|6616KRD XyzZT 93090|8909084545) could be used instead of H(6565) for a customer with an SSN 6565. This method allows us to enlarge the domain size and makes exhaustive search impossible. The aggregated intersection problem is to find the common secret items in the dimensions tables in the context of data warehouse. ABACUS uses the common attributes in all of the tables to hash secret items i.e., the values of common attributes are used instead of a value of a primary key. For example, the attributes SSN, Name, Surname, Phone, and Address are common in T 1 , T 2 and T 3 in Example 1. If 5 attributes each of which is 10 characters long are used in hashing, the domain size would be
250 which makes exhaustive search impossible. As mentioned before, hash collisions might result in sharing a secret item which is not in the intersection. H maps values to | DomH | which is assumed to be arbitrarily large compare to the intersection size. Let N =| DomH |; in the random oracle model, the probability that n hash values have at least one collision equals [2] :
). For 1024 bit hash values and n = 1 million, this probability is 10 −295 [2] . Thus, the solution to expand the domain size minimizes the probability of data vulnerability by exhaustive search and also helps in reducing the probability of hash collisions, and therefore, errors in the queries are significantly reduced.
Aggregated Join Queries
One of the most important query operators supported by current commercial database systems is the join operator. Privacy preserving join operations have not been previously considered in database research or in current database management systems. However, they might be needed in data sharing across private data sources. For example, a company (e.g. a hotel) might want to know the transaction details of its customers in other companies (e.g. airlines) in the market to classify them according to their transactions. For instance, a hotel can identify the customers that travel frequently and offer special promotions to them. To be able to do this, it needs to join its customers table with other companies' sales tables. Since other companies may benefit from this process, they might be willing to share transaction details. However, during this process companies are not willing to reveal any information about a customer who is not a customer of the other company as well as his/her existence. Traditional join query processing techniques cannot be used to process these queries since they do not consider privacy issues. In order to satisfy these requirements, we propose a new join operator, the aggregated join query operator, to be used for privacy preserving data sharing across private data warehouses. We first formally define the aggregated join query processing problem and then propose a solution.
The aggregated join query processing problem is formally defined as follows:
Assume data source P1 has a dimension We illustrate the problem with an example. Assume the three data warehouses in Example 1 want to execute an aggregated join query. And assume P1 poses the aggregated join query to find the aggregated join of its dimension table, Customers Table, with the fact tables, Sales Table, of the other data sources as shown in Figure 4 . The problem is to provide an answer to this query without revealing any additional information. For this example, P2 will return the tuples with SSN 6565 and 8080 in its Sales During the query processing, no extra useful information gets revealed. In the intersection phase, all data sources compute the intersection of the dimension tables and in the join computation phase, all data sources other than the query poser send the related tuples from their fact tables. As a result, no site gains extra useful information other than the intersection and the join results.
Aggregate Query Processing
The traditional aggregation operation is generally used to compute the aggregate of a list of values such as SUM, AVERAGE or MIN/MAX. One kind of privacy preserving aggregation can be thought of as computing the aggregation of values in the union of lists coming from different data sources such that each data source will only know the final aggregate but nothing else. To execute these queries, each data source can compute its local aggregate and the final aggregate can be computed in such a way that none of the data sources will know the local aggregate of other data sources (Secure multiparty computation or the technique described in this section can be used to compute the final aggregate value for SUM and AVERAGE). However, data sources may not be willing to execute aggregation operations over their whole data or may want to know more than the sum of the values in several lists. Therefore, there is a need for new types of aggregation queries. In this section, we will introduce Row-Based Aggregation and Column-Based Aggregation queries. We formally define Row-Based Aggregation queries and show how to process them in Section 4.1. Then, we will present Column-Based Aggregation queries and techniques to execute them efficiently in Section 4.2.
Row-Based Aggregation
Enterprises may want to know the total expenditure of a customer in the market. For example, hotels and airlines may want to classify their customers based on their travel expenses. Without privacy concerns it is easy to perform this classification task. One of the enterprises may collect data from all enterprises and perform the computation. However, they may not be willing to reveal their value during this operation. For example, an airline company may not be willing to reveal an expenditure of a customer to other airlines since other airlines may try to attract this customer. For instance, if a customer's expenditure in company C 1 is 80, and another company C 2 knows that his/her expenditure in C 1 is 80, then C 2 can offer a new deal to this customer and try to attract him/her using this information. Although enterprises may not be willing to reveal their earnings from a customer, they may want to know the total expenditure of the customer without revealing their values. For example, these hotels and airlines may be willing to know the total expenditure of a customer in these hotels and airlines (i.e., total expenditure in the market) without revealing their earnings from this customer so that competing hotels and airlines protect their private information from each other. Since the traditional aggregation operation is not strong enough to support these needs, ABACUS proposes a new type of aggregation queries, Row-Based Aggregation queries, and a new technique to execute them in a privacy preserving manner in the context of data warehouses.
For the sake of this discussion, we will first define the row-based aggregation on a Then, the problem is to obtain the answer of the query without revealing any additional information.
The above problem formulation is for SUM queries. We solve the above problem with some relaxation. The relaxation is that a data source with Key in its database can learn who else has the same Key (Note that this information is the same as the result of aggregated intersection). However, it is impossible to learn the Value associated with that Key at the other data warehouses. Extending our solution to support AVERAGE queries is straightforward and discussed briefly at the end of this section. To classify customers, one should know their total expenditures in the market. In other words, a row-based aggregation is needed for this process so that at the end of query pro- [6565, 80] means that the customer with SSN 6565 has a total expenditure of 80 in companies P1, P2, P3 and P4. ABACUS can process row-based aggregation queries in a privacy preserving manner while revealing some information which is typically acceptable in an honest-but-curious environment. For example, each company will learn who else has a customer with the same SSN as in its list. For instance, P1 will know that 6565 exists in all data sources, while 7070 also exists in P3 and P4, and 8080 exists in P2 and P3. During this query processing, none of the data sources will be able to learn the value of a specific key of the other data sources. For example, P1 will not learn that 6565 has an expenditure of 50 in P2 , but will learn that 80 is the total expenditure of 6565 in all of the companies. Note that, if only two data sources have the same key, they may not share their values with each other by rejecting aggregation on that key (because they can learn each other's value for that key). ABACUS allows users to configure their privacy policies for this kind of policy related issues and handle them efficiently. We will discuss these issues later in this section.
A and a random number, ri, and pass the token to the next party. Therefore, P 1 creates a token with a label H(Key) and adds V1 + r1 , then passes it to P2. The other parties follow the same protocol and pass the token to the next one. At the end of first circulation, P1will get V1 + r1 + V2 + r2 + V3 + r3 + V4 + r4 for a token with a label H(Key). There is no way to determine the value of a specific party during the course of the first circulation because of the random numbers added. In the second circulation, all parties subtract the random numbers they added during the first circulation. Therefore, at the end of second circulation, P1 would have a token with a label H(Key) and the sum of the values for that Key, V1 + V2 + V3 + V4. Although it seems secure, this basic technique has two problems. Since this process is needed for every item in the list, using the same random number for every item in the list may result in information leakage such as the difference between two values. To prevent this information leakage, parties should use a different random number for each item in their lists. Therefore, every data source should maintain a list of random numbers it used during this process which is not scalable for large lists. Another problem is that any two of the data sources could collude and learn the value of another data source. For example, P2 and P4 could learn the value of P3, V3. In the first circulation, P4 would pass the token with a label H(Key) and V1 + r1 + V2 + r2 + V3 + r3 + V4 + r4 to P1 and in the second circulation, P1 would pass V1 + V2 + r2 + V3 + r3 + V4 + r4 to P2 . Since P2 and P4 know V1 + r1 + V2 + r2 + V3 + r3 + V4 + r4 and V1 + V2 + r2 + V3 + r3 + V4 + r4 they could figure out r1, and thus V1(Note that P1 passed V1 + r1 to P2 in the first circulation). Therefore, P2 and P4 could collude and reveal the value of P1 without revealing their values to each other or to the other parties.
In order to compute aggregation securely, ABACUS uses Shamir's secret sharing technique, which allows one to compute any linear combination of secret values. ABACUS uses this property to perform SUM and AVERAGE queries thus computing aggregation without revealing individual values.
Shamir's Secret Sharing
Shamir's secret sharing method [13] allows a dealer D to distribute a secret value vs among n peers {P1, P2, ..., Pn}, such that knowledge of any k (k ≤ n) peers is required to reconstruct the secret. Since, even complete knowledge of k − 1 peers cannot reveal any information about the secret, Shamir's method is information theoretically secure. Dealer D chooses a random polynomial q(x) of degree k − 1 where the constant term is the secret value, vs, and a publicly known set of n random points. The dealer computes the share of each peer as q(xi) and sends it to peer Pi. The method is summarized in Algorithm 1. In order to construct the secret value vs, any set of k peers will need to share the information they have received. After finding the polynomial q(x), the secret value vs = q(0) can be reconstructed. q(x) can be found using Lagrange interpolation such that p(xi) = sharei where i = 1, ..., k. The key observation is that at least k points and the respective shares are required to determine a unique polynomial q(x) of degree k − 1.
Algorithmus 1. Shamir's Secret Sharing Algorithm

Row-Based Aggregation in ABACUS ABACUS executes row-based aggregation queries in three phases: Distribution phase, Intermediate-Computation phase, and Final-Computation phase.
Distribution Phase
After the query is posed, m data sources decide on the degree of the polynomial that is going to be used in Shamir's secret sharing (the degree of the polynomial should be greater than or equal to m − 1). They also choose n ≥ m random values X = {x1, ..., xn}. Without loss of generality, we will use a polynomial of degree of m − 1 and n = m in our setting. The intermediate computation process at data source P i is summarized in Algorithm 3. [2] 11: Again, since X = {x1, x2, .., xn} is known by the data sources, there are m unknown coefficients including AV G and m equations and thus, AV G can be derived from the above equations.
Row-Based Aggregation in Data Warehouses
After the query is posed, data sources create lists of [Key,Value] pairs using their fact and dimension tables so that row-based aggregation can be performed over them with the above technique. All information in the dimension Figure 4 creates [Key-Value] pairs as follows: for a tuple with SSN 6565, it retrieves other information about 6565 from the customers table such as name, surname and address. Then, it combines those information to create the Key for this tuple and the amount is used as the Value.
Properties of the Algorithm
Data sources use a one-way hash function to hide Key, and thus all of the data sources will learn H(Key). Only those data sources which have Key would be able to know Key and its existence at data source Pi. In addition, Pi uses Shamir's secret sharing to hide the value associated with Key from other data sources. It uses a polynomial degree of m − 1 and m random points to compute shares of the m data sources. Then, it keeps one of these shares for itself and sends the remaining m − 1 shares to the other parties. Since all of the m shares are needed to reveal the secret value in Shamir's secret sharing method, the other data sources would not be able to compute the value, even if they combine their shares coming from Pi.
In general, for any Key at any data source Pj , any data source Pi can prevent execution of aggregation for that Key. Since one of the m shares is sent to Pi, Pi can prevent aggregation on Key by not sending the intermediate result to the other data sources. Therefore, other data sources would not be able to learn SUM for Key. Using this property, ABACUS allows data sources to control sharing the value of Key with other data sources. This might be needed since if only two data sources have Key, performing row-based aggregation will result in revealing the values to these two data sources (the result is the sum of the two values, and since these data source know their values, they can figure out the other value from the result). Note that, if Key exists in only one data source, then the owner can protect it from other data sources This can easily be done by preventing aggregation on Key. In addition to these, data sources cannot figure out something from their shares using the distribution of values since they are random values (i.e., a random polynomial is used for each item in the list to compute the shares).
Column-Based Aggregation
Enterprises might want to know the size of the market and some statistical information about the market where they compete. In addition, they might be interested in expenditures of their customers such as the ratio of their expenditures in their companies to their total expenditures in the market. In other words, a company might want to know how much it satisfies the needs of customers. Therefore, companies might be willing to collaborate to perform these kinds of operations however, they might not want to reveal extra information, for example a company might not want to reveal how much it satisfies the needs of its customers. One way to compute the market size in a privacy preserving manner is to aggregate the expenditures of all customers in that market. Formally, data sources P1, P2, .., Pm might want to know sum of their local sums LS1, LS2, ..., LSm respectively, and the global sum GS = LS1 + ... + LSm, without revealing their local sums. This problem could be solved with the technique discussed in Section 4.1. However, in a competitive environment it is unrealistic to expect enterprises to share their local sums. For example, a big company with 1000 customers might not be willing to share its local sum which is the sum of its 1000 customers with a small company with 10 customers. Instead, it might want to collaborate for the common customers to compute their total expenditures, so that both companies could learn how much they satisfy the needs of their customers. However, during this process they do not want to reveal any additional information. In order to satisfy these needs, we introduce column-based aggregation.
Formally, the column-based aggregation query processing problem is defined as follows: The goal of the query processing is to compute column-based aggregation such that the data source posing the query, Pi, would only know the result of the query, At the end of the query processing other data sources will only know their common Keys with the query poser Pi and Pi will only know the result of the column based aggregation query result but nothing else. After intersection phase, the other data sources will know the common elements between Pi and them but nothing else, since one-way hash function is used to hide Keys. During local aggregation for intersection phase, the data sources would compute their local aggregates. Then, in the global aggregation phase, they compute the sum of the local aggregations without revealing their local aggregations to anybody with the row-based aggregation. Therefore, Pi would only know the global aggregation result, which is column based aggregation result but not the local aggregations. And the other data sources would not know any other local aggregation and the global aggregation results unless Piwants them to know (Note that if Pi does not send its intermediate result to other data sources, they cannot compute the global sum in the row-based aggregation in Section 4.1).
Analytical Evaluation
In this section, we compute the query response times for the proposed query processing techniques. The query responses time for intersection and join queries are studied in Section 5.1. Then, the query execution costs of row-based aggregation and columnbased aggregation queries are calculated in Section 5.2. Finally, we show the query response times of the queries over a sample scenario to demonstrate the scalability of our technique in Section 5.3.
Cost of Intersection and Join Query Processing
Data source Pi hashes its list and sends to m data sources. Then, it compares its list with other datasources to find the intersection. Therefore, the computation cost is the cost of hashing the list and the cost of comparisons. Let . The query response time, the sum of the computation and communication cost, is:
In the aggregated join, the first step is aggregated intersection. After this first step, data source Pj sends the related tuples to Pi. The query response time is sum of the cost of aggregated intersection and the cost of sending related tuples. Therefore, the query response time for aggregated join is:
where v is the size of a tuple t ∈ TR.
Cost of Aggregation Query Processing
The Cost of Row-Based Aggregation Query Processing In the distribution phase, data sources compute the hash value of keys and the shares of m data sources. Therefore, the computation cost is m×|L| CP U speed + C h × |L|. The communication cost is sending these shares to other data sources and receiving shares from other data sources, which is The Cost of Column-Based Aggregation Query Processing The column-based aggregation query processing consists of three phases: 1) intersection phase 2) local aggregation for intersection 3) global aggregation. In the intersection phase, data source Pi sends its hashed lists to m data sources. The communication and computation cost for this phase is:
The cost of computation in local aggregation for intersection phase is
(data sources calculates the sum of values in the intersection). Remember that there is no communication in this phase. The cost of global aggregation phase is negligible since the cost of the summation of m values using m parties is negligible in this context. Therefore, the cost of column-based aggregation query processing is:
Query Response Times over a Sample Scenario
We demonstrate the query response time of ABACUS for intersection and row-based and column based aggregation queries over a sample scenario to show that it is scalable and efficient. We compute the response times for queries in an environment where m data warehouses each of which with a dimension table and a fact table size of 1 million. We execute the queries over these data warehouses by varying the bandwidth and the number of data warehouses involved, m. Figures 5, 6 , and 7 show the query response time for intersection, row-based aggregation and column-based aggregation queries. During these calculations we take the size of key-value pair, b, as 1024 bits, the cost of hashing, C h , as 10 −4 [5] seconds and the cost of solving an equation, Ceq, as 10
seconds (the time needed to solve an equation system with 20 unknowns in Matlab).
The analytical evaluations and the results over the sample scenario demonstrate that ABACUS is scalable in terms of the number of parties participating in queries and the cost is increasing linearly with the number of parties involved. In addition as results show that the query processing is communication intensive operation since ABACUS uses light-weight computations.
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a distributed middleware, ABACUS, to perform intersection, join and aggregation queries over multiple private data warehouses in a privacy preserving manner. In addition to this, we present new types of aggregation queries which are needed for privacy preserving data sharing. Analytical evaluations demonstrate that the proposed scheme is efficient and scalable.
